In spite of the importance of FDI in Japan, Japan's official statistics on inward FDI have many drawbacks in comparison with U.S. statistics. Using micro-data of the Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan, we compile new statistics on the employment of Japanese affiliates of foreign firms (JAFF) in Japan at the 3-digit industry level for the year 1996. According to our new statistics, JAFF with 33.4% or more foreign ownership in the service sector employed 308,000 workers in 1996, which is nearly five times greater than the number reported in MITI (1999). In the case of the manufacturing sector, JAFF with 33.4% or more foreign ownership employed 176,000 workers in 1996, which is 10% greater than the number reported in MITI (1999). The underestimation of MITI's survey is substantial in the case of the service sector. Using our statistics, we compare FDI in Japan with FDI in the United States at the 3-digit industry level. We also compare FDI in Japan with Japan's outward direct investment and international trade in goods and services.
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Existing Data on FDI in Japan and Compilation of the New Statistics
Probably the most commonly cited statistics on Japan's inward direct investment are those provided by the Ministry of Finance. (MOF 1999 , the data are also available in OECD 1999). According to these data, Japan's outward direct investment stock in the service sector is nine times greater than the corresponding inward direct investment stock (Table 1) . Since no other OECD country has an imbalance of this magnitude, it has been argued that this imbalance indicates the closedness of the Japanese economy to inward direct investment in the service industries (GATT 1995 , MITI 1998 , Stern 2000 . In the case of the manufacturing sector, the outward direct investment stock is six times greater than the corresponding inward direct investment stock. But since the MOF data only record cross-border capital flows, they do not necessarily correspond to the extent of affiliates' actual activities. For example, because of Japanese regulations, many foreign banks and insurance companies entered the Japanese market by setting up branches rather than founding subsidiary companies. This fact makes their investment flows relatively small compared with the actual magnitude of their affiliates' activities measured by sales or employment.
INSERT TABLE 1
In the case of inward direct investment, the Gaishi-kei Kigyo Doko Chosa (Survey on Trends of
Business Activities by Japanese Subsidiaries of Foreign Firms) by the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI, which is now the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, METI) is the only official source on the sales and employment of foreign firms' Japanese subsidiaries. 2 According to this survey (METI 2001a) , foreign firms' Japanese subsidiaries employed 230,475 workers in manufacturing industries and only 85,386 workers in non-manufacturing industries at the end of March 2000. The survey is loosely based on the U.S. Department of Commerce's survey of foreign direct investment in the United
States, but MITI's survey has the following serious drawbacks for the purpose of studies on inward direct investment.
(i) It is not mandatory and suffers from a low response ratio. In the case of the survey for the 1999 fiscal Japanese Government (various years). 2 MITI's other survey, Kigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa (Basic Survey on Business Activities by Enterprises), also collects data on JAFF as part of information obtained on Japanese firms. But this survey covers only the manufacturing and commerce sectors. Moreover, the response ratio of this survey is also low. In 1999, the Japan Management and Coordination Agency added questions on whether firms were majority owned by foreigners or not to their survey, Service-gyo Kihon Chosa (Basic Survey on Service Sector), which covers several service industries. An upcoming report of this survey will probably include some 4 workers. 4 Judging by the number of subsidiaries and number of workers employed by subsidiaries, the coverage of the Toyo Keizai data is much broader than that of MITI in the case of the non-manufacturing sectors.
Using Toyo Keizai's data as the basic statistics for the estimation, Fukao and Ito (2001) estimated sales and employment data for Japanese affiliates of foreign firms (JAFF) and foreign affiliates of Japanese firms (FAJF) in service sectors at the 3-digit level for the year 1995. Although the coverage is broader, the Toyo Keizai data have the following shortcomings.
(i) Industry Classification
In Toyo Keizai's data, information at the establishment level is not available. We need to classify affiliates according to their primary industry based on line-of-business. For example, computer makers sometimes supply computer-related services. However, the Toyo Keizai data do not allow us to treat their service and manufacturing activities separately.
(ii) Definition of Nationality Toyo Keizai adopts multiple criteria in the coverage of Japanese subsidiaries. For listed or unlisted but large subsidiaries, the cut-off capital participation rate is 20%. For unlisted and small subsidiaries, the cut-off rate is 49%.
(iii) Coverage and Reliability
Toyo Keizai conducts its own surveys for this database. 5 Toyo Keizai also uses additional data such as financial reports for non-responding firms. But since firms are not obliged by law to report correct information, Toyo Keizai's data is not perfect in their coverage and reliability.
(iv) Branches and Other Establishments Directly Owned by Foreign Firms
In the case of the banking and insurance sector, the Toyo Keizai data cover Japanese branches and other establishments directly owned by foreign firms. However, the data only partially cover such establishments in other sectors.
Compared with MITI's statistics and Toyo Keizai's data, data collected in the Jigyosho-Kigyo 4 A private company, Teikoku Data Bank Ltd. provides the database "Cosmos" which covers 1.1 million Japanese firms for 1999. In the case of the non-manufacturing sector, the database contains information on 1,236 firms which were more than one quarter foreign-owned. The database was too expensive for us to use for this research. Some statistics on these firms are available at <www.tdb.co.jp>. 5 In the case of inward FDI, Toyo Keizai and Dun & Bradstreet Japan Ltd. jointly conduct their surveys for this database.
Tokei Chosa (Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan), conducted by the Japan Management and
Coordination Agency (which is now the Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications) are advantageous in several respects. This is the most basic and important survey on Japanese establishments and covers all industries. Since it is mandatory, the data are more reliable. The survey collects both data on establishments and data on enterprises, and these two sets of data are linked. In the survey, companies are asked what percentage of their paid-in capital is owned by foreign firms. Therefore we can compile statistics at the establishment level and choose any cut-off ratio. 6 The data also include branches and other establishments directly owned by foreign firms. In Table 2 , we compare the Establishment and Enterprise Census data with MITI's statistics and the Toyo Keizai data.
INSERT TABLE 2
Although the data collected in this survey are ideal for a compilation of statistics on the number of workers employed by all the JAFF, such statistics are unfortunately not included in the report on this survey. Therefore we compile micro-data of the survey by ourselves. In spite of the merits listed above, the micro-data of the Establishment and Enterprise Census have the following shortcomings.
(i) Information on Activities
Data collected in the Establishment and Enterprise Census do not include basic information on activities, such as sales and profits. They include information on employment, location, and date of establishment. Therefore we measure activities of JAFF by number of workers.
(ii) Years Covered
The question on the percentage of paid-in capital owned by foreigners was only added to the survey by the Japan Management and Coordination Agency in 1996. The same question was also included in their 2001 survey, which is not available yet. So the only available data at present are those for 1996 .
(iii) Linkage between Data on Establishments and Data on Enterprises
For about five percent of all establishments, we were not able to link them with any head office although they replied that they are neither a head office nor an independent establishment. We treated them as Japanese independent establishments. Our estimates on the employment of JAFF probably 6 Each establishment is asked about its major activity at the 4-digit industry level. If we compiled the data at an industry level this detailed, our data on many industries would include less than three JAFF and we would be forced to suppress the data for secrecy. For this reason, we compile the data at the 3-digit industry level. In the case of manufacturing industries, we basically use the Standard Industry Classification for Japan (Statistics Bureau 1993) . In the case of non-manufacturing industries, we use our own classification (for details, see Fukao and Ito 2001) .
6 underestimate the actual values because of this problem.
(iv) Definition of Nationality
In the 1996 survey, head offices and independent establishments were asked what percentage of their paid-in capital was owned by foreigners. When we set our cut-off capital participation rate at 10%, our data on JAFF include all the affiliates of which one or several foreigners owned 10 % or more in total.
In the case of U.S. statistics on U.S. affiliates owned by foreign firms (USAFF), the data include only the affiliates of which a single foreigner owns 10% or more (U.S. Department of Commerce 1995a).
Therefore our definition of JAFF (10% foreign-owned or more) is broader than the U.S. definition of USAFF (owned 10% or more). In the case of data on affiliates owned 50 % or more by foreign firms, there is no such gap between our statistics and U.S. statistics (U.S. Department of Commerce 1995b). Both the statistics include all the affiliates of which the ownership of one or several foreigners exceeds 50% in total.
Substantial amount of stocks issued by Japanese prime firms are owned by foreign institutional investors as portfolio investments. 7 When we set our cut-off ratio at 10%, probably our data will include such portfolio investments. Taking account of this risk, we will mainly use the 33.4% or 50% cut-off ratio. Table 3 and Table 4 present the number of establishments and number of workers of foreign-owned affiliates in the Japanese economy at the 3-digit industry level. We set our cut-off capital participation rate at 10 %, 33.4%, and 50%.
INSERT TABLE 3 and TABLE 4 In order to compare FDI in Japan with FDI in the United States, we adjusted corresponding U.S.
statistics for the year 1992 which are reported in U.S. Department of Commerce (1995a) to our industry classifications. The results are reported in Table 5 . For the U.S.-Japan comparison we also prepared Table   6 , in which we compared the share of the number of workers employed by majority-owned foreign affiliates in the United States and Japan. The U.S. data is taken from the U.S. Department of Commerce (1995b). Since the U.S. data are not available at the 3-digit industry level, the U.S.-Japan comparison in Table 6 is done at the more aggregated industry level.
INSERT TABLE 5 AND TABLE 6 In order to compare our data on Japan's inward FDI with Japan's outward FDI, we prepared data on the outward FDI. In the case of the manufacturing sector, we compiled micro-data of MITI's Dai 26-kai 7 According to Japan National Conference of Stock Exchanges (2001), 11.9% of total market value in Japanese stock markets was owned by foreigners on March 31, 1996 . On March 31, 2001 .8% was owned by foreigners. Figure 1 shows the industry composition of workers employed by JAFF (33.4% or more foreign-owned). In the case of the manufacturing sector, four industries, motor vehicles & parts, electronic parts & devices, electric equipment & computers, and drugs and medicines account for 51% of all the workers employed by JAFF in the manufacturing sector. In the case of the service sector, FDI is even more concentrated in a limited number of industries. Four industries, wholesale trade, eating and drinking places, retail trade, and computer programming and software account for 77% of all the workers employed by JAFF.
INSERT FIGURE 1
Using Second, as we have already pointed out, because of regulations of Japan's authorities, many foreign banks and insurance companies entered Japan through setting up branches instead of founding subsidiary companies. This fact makes their investment flows relatively small compared with the actual sizes of their affiliates' activities measured by sales or employment.
In the case of the manufacturing sector, imbalances between the activities of JAFF and those of FAJF are greater than those reported in the MOF FDI statistics. In terms of employment, the JAFF(33.4%
or more foreign-owned)/FAJF(10% or more foreign-owned) ratio is 0.095 (=176,000/1,848,000).
Next we compare FDI in Japan with FDI in the United States. Using Table 6 and Table 7 , we can compare Japan's and America's purchases of services from foreigners. For the service sector as a whole, Japan's ratio of imports to total domestic output is 2.11%, which is almost at the same level as the corresponding U.S. ratio at 2.07% (Table 7) . But in the case of inward FDI (Table 6 ), Japan's ratio of the number of workers employed by majority-owned foreign affiliates to the total number of workers is 0.59%, which is less than one fifth of the corresponding US ratio of 2.77%. It seems that Japan's market for services is more closed for establishment transaction than for cross-border transactions.
In the case of the manufacturing sector, Japan's ratio of the number of workers employed by majority-owned foreign affiliates to the total number of workers is 0.79%, which is less than one-thirteenth of the corresponding US ratio of 10.48%. Compared with the case of the service sector, the gap between FDI in Japan and that in the United States is much larger in the case of the manufacturing sector.
In cases where cross-border transactions in goods and services are not difficult, multinational corporations will choose the location where the production costs are the lowest. Since Japan's wage rates and land prices are relatively high, Japan probably has a locational disadvantage for manufacturing industries except those in which proximity to consumers plays an important role. We know that a substantial part of Japan's FDI in U.S. manufacturing industries was caused by US trade barriers, such as "voluntary" restraints on car exports and anti-dumping policies on electrical machinery exports from Japan during the 1980s. Therefore we cannot argue that Japan's low level of inward FDI itself is problematic.
Compared with the case of the manufacturing sector, the low level of FDI in Japan's service sector is more serious issue. Since many services are untradable, Japanese customers cannot enjoy advanced services of foreign firms, if the foreign firms do not establish affiliates in Japan.
Using Table 6 , we can compare Japan's and the United States' penetration of inward FDI, which we measure by the ratio of the number of workers employed by majority-owned foreign affiliates to the total number of workers at a detailed industry level. According to Table 6 , this ratio is higher for Japan than that for the United States in only three industries: Finance except depository institutions, computer and data processing services, and other services (such as eating and drinking places and individual education facilities). It is also interesting to note that in Japan, differences in this ratio among industries are more remarkable than in the United States. Japan's variation coefficient of this ratio among manufacturing industries is 1.43 compared to a variation coefficient of only 0.93 for the United States (Table 6 ). In the case of non-manufacturing industries, Japan's variation coefficient is 1.26 compared to that of 0.74 for the United States (Table 6 ). In Japan, there are what may be labeled sanctuary sectors, such as medical services, utilities, and education, in which almost no foreign affiliate exists (Table 5) . Inward FDI is impeded by a lack of market access. For example, private corporations which seek profits are prohibited to do business in major areas of education and medical services. INSERT TABLE 8 So far, our analysis was static and mainly based on data for 1996. But we should note that FDI into Japan is growing at an amazing speed. Moreover, the recent stagnation of Japan's land and stock prices has created a kind of "fire-sale" situation, from which foreign investors have benefited. We can confirm the recent increase in FDI to Japan's service sector by our micro-data of the Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan. Figure 2 shows distribution of 10% or more foreign-owned establishments by year of establishment. We can see that in the case of the manufacturing sector, the majority of establishments were started up before 1984. 11 In contrast with this, in the case of the service sector, many establishments were started up after 1990. Figure   3 shows the cumulative number of JAFF established before each year. In the case of information services and communication and broadcasting, the number of JAFF has increased drastically after 1990.
INSERT FIGURE 2 and FIGURE 3
Probably we can partly explain the recent rapid increase in JAFF in the service sector by the history of Japan's regulations on inward FDI. Japan's process of inward FDI liberalization and Japan's remaining major restrictions on inward FDI are summarized in Tables 10, 11 and 12. As Table 10 shows, after joining the OECD in 1964, Japan gradually and systematically liberalized its regulations on inward FDI. In the case of the manufacturing sector, Japan lifted almost all the regulations by 1980 except those on FDI in the petroleum and leather product industries (Table 10 and Table 12 ). In the cases of many service industries, Japan continued to restrict inward FDI by foreign exchange law and other regulatory laws until quite recently (Table 10 and Table 11 ).
INSERT TABLE 10, 11, 12
Econometric Analysis on Determinants of Inward FDI Penetration
As we have seen in the previous section, there are significant differences in inward FDI penetration in the various industries and in Japan and the United States. What industry characteristics affect the inward FDI penetration of each industry? In this section we conduct an empirical study on this issue.
This type of cross-industry analysis on FDI into Japan has been conducted by Lawrence (1993) , Weinstein (1996) , Shibuya (1995, 1997) , Horaguchi (1995), and Ito (2001) . 12 One of the most hotly debated issues in these studies was whether Japan's keiretsu relationships impede inward FDI. It has been argued that keiretsu relationships reduce inward FDI through cross share-holdings and long-term supplier relationships. Using MITI (1991) data on only ten industries, Lawrence (1993) did a cross-industry regression and found that keiretsu relationships significantly impeded inward foreign direct investment. By constructing panel data based on MOF data, Weinstein (1996) conducted a similar kind of regression and found that the coefficient on the shares of financial group member sales in each sector is negative but not significant in many cases. Shibuya (1995, 1997) , using their newly compiled statistics on Japan's inward FDI penetration (the share of sales by JAFF in total sales) in 58 manufacturing industries from micro-data of MITI's Kigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa (Basic Survey on Business Activities by Enterprises) conducted a cross-industry regression.
They found that sales concentration as measured by the Herfindahl index has significant negative effects on Japan's inward FDI penetration, while capital intensity and skilled-worker intensity have significant positive effects on the FDI penetration. They also found that keiretsu variables and a government barrier dummy variable based on OECD (various issues) do not have a significant effect on FDI penetration.
Horaguchi (1995) also found that a coefficient on the keiretsu share was not significant. For the Japanese service industries, Fukao and Ito (2001) conducted a cross-industry regression and found that the inward 12 FDI penetration is low in industries where government-owned establishments are dominant. Moreover, they found that the relatively higher FDI restrictiveness in Japan compared to that in the United States has significantly negative effects on Japan's inward FDI. In the case of keiretsu variables, they did not get significant results, suggesting that keiretsu do not act as an impediment to inward FDI in Japan's service sector.
These previous empirical studies have some shortcomings with regard to the data bases used in the analyses. First, several studies such as Lawrence (1993) are based on a very small sample size. Second, although FDI in services is an important issue, except for Fukao and Ito (2001) , there is no study on FDI in this sector. And third, as we mentioned in Section 2, the data these studies used are based on firm-level
surveys. Yet, as one firm is often involved in diversified businesses spanning different industries, it is more appropriate to use establishment-level surveys to capture the size of activities in each detailed industry.
In this section we estimate an empirical model explaining the determinants of Japan's inward FDI penetration. The variables of this estimation are defined in Table 13 . Further details on the definitions and sources of the variables are provided in Appendix. We use Japan's FDI penetration ratio as the dependent variable. 13 Japan's FDI penetration is defined by Japan's ratio of the number of workers employed by companies that are 10% or more foreign-owned to the total number of workers. In addition, taking into account the different attributes between manufacturing and service sectors, we assume different models for the estimations of the two sectors.
INSERT TABLE 13
The standard FDI theory (see, for example, Caves 1982 and Dunning 1988) emphasizes intangible assets, such as the stock of technological knowledge accumulated by R&D or the accumulation of marketing know-how from past advertising, as a source of multinational enterprises' advantages. When a firm moves production overseas, it is in a disadvantageous position in relation to local firms because of differences in terms of language, customs and institutions. Multinational enterprises will exist only if the foreign establishments they control and operate attain lower costs or higher revenue productivity than the same establishments functioning under local management. According to this theory, we will observe more active FDI in R&D-intensive or advertisement-intensive industries. We would expect positive coefficients for RDINT (R&D intensity) and ADINT (advertisement intensity). If Japanese firms' productivity level is higher than that of foreign firms, Japanese firms would have a higher sales share in the world market and (1994) conducted similar types of cross-industry analyses. 13 On the theoretical foundation of cross-industry estimation, see Kogut and Chang (1991) , Petri (1991) , and Lawrence (1993) . On keiretsu, also see Saxonhouse (1993) .
inward FDI will be limited. To take account of this factor, we used DPROD (an index comparing Japan's productivity in each industry with the U.S. equivalent) which was taken from Kawai (1996) . We should note that it is problematic to use this variable for the following reasons. First, since Japanese firms compete not only with U.S. firms but also with other countries' firms, DPROD is not an appropriate variable. Second, in Kawai's (1996) methodology, if Japan's absolute producer price level in one industry is higher than the corresponding U.S. price level and if this gap cannot be explained by Japan-U.S.
differences in factor prices and prices of intermediate inputs, then Japan's productivity in that industry is inferred to be lower compared to the United States. But there is a possibility that Japan's high absolute price level (relatively low DPROD) might reveal either Japan's higher industry rent or Japan's higher fixed costs. Third, there might exist a reverse causality. High inward FDI penetration might increase DPROD through either reducing the industry rent or improving that industry's productivity.
In cases where cross-border transactions are not difficult, for example due to low transportation costs or the characteristics of the services, multinational corporations will choose the location where the production costs are the lowest. 14 Therefore, the inward FDI penetration ratio will be affected by Japan's locational advantage for each industry. Since Japan's capital prices are relatively low and land prices and wages of unskilled workers are relatively high, Japan probably has a locational advantage for capital-intensive industries and a disadvantage for land-intensive or unskilled worker-intensive industries.
Consequently, we would expect positive coefficients for CLRATIO (capital-labor ratio) and UNIV (skilled-labor intensity), and a negative coefficient for LAND (land intensity). Since it is considered that the capital intensity is a more important determinant in the manufacturing sector and it is difficult to get reliable data on capital intensity in the case of the non-manufacturing sector, we introduce CLRATIO only in the manufacturing sector regressions. It has been argued that firm-specific skills play a more important role in Japanese firms and that this feature has hindered the development of the secondary labor market in Japan. This fact might impede the entry of foreign firms (Weinstein 1996) . In order to take this factor into account, we prepared JOBSEP (job separation rate). 15 We expect a positive coefficient for this variable.
Industrial organization theory, moreover, suggests that new entries are often deterred in an oligopolistic market. For example, an incumbent firm often takes strategic actions to deter new entries, and entry into an industry may be difficult where the minimum efficient scale is large relative to the market size.
Therefore, we introduced two variables representing market concentration, HERF (Herfindahl index) and CR4 (top 4-firm concentration ratio), and would expect negative coefficients for both.
To find out the effects of government regulation on inward FDI, we prepared the variables, REGCUR and REGPAST for the manufacturing sector regressions, and RINVJAUS (Japan's FDI restrictiveness minus U.S. FDI restrictiveness) for service sector regressions. REGCUR is a dummy variable which takes 1 for currently regulated industries, and REGPAST is a dummy variable which takes 1 for industries regulated in the past. To construct RINVJAUS, following Hoekman (1996), we compiled a frequency measure for FDI restrictiveness at the 3-digit industry level, using data from GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) schedules for Japan and the United States, APEC (1996), OECD (various issues), Japan Investment Council (various years), and the Japanese Government (various years).
The two countries' FDI restrictiveness indices are reported in Panel B of Table 5 . According to these indices, Japan has not welcomed liberalization in the fields of transportation, medicine, postal services, temporary staffing services, agriculture-related services, ship repair, and electricity/gas. RINVJAUS is defined as the difference between the FDI restrictiveness of Japan and the United States. We expect a negative coefficient for this variable.
Moreover, inward FDI in an industry will be limited, if government-owned establishments dominate the industry. To study this effect, we used PUBEMP (the share of workers employed by local or central government). We expect a negative coefficient for PUBEMP.
In order to take account of the effects of the keiretsu, we used two keiretsu variables, HORIZ (the share of workers employed by horizontal keiretsu firms) and VERT (the share of workers employed by vertical keiretsu firms. If the keiretsu impedes inward FDI, we will have negative coefficients. In order to control for differences in the tradability of different goods and services, we used FDIUS (U.S. inward FDI penetration), though we think that tradability is a more important determinant of FDI in the service sector than in the manufacturing sector. We expect a positive coefficient for this variable.
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We conduct an ordinary least squares regression for the manufacturing sector and a Tobit estimation for the service sector, since there exists a lower bound, zero, for our dependent variable in the aggregated level, we do not use it. 16 In his comment, Sadao Nagaoka pointed out that market growth might be an important determinant of inward FDI. Following this comment, we added a new variable, the growth rate of domestic demand from 1985 to 1995, which we obtained from Japan's Linked Input-Output Tables. The estimated coefficient of this variable was negative but insignificant both for the manufacturing and the service sector. Moreover, inclusion of this variable in our regression equations did not substantially change the estimated values and the significance of coefficients on other variables. Therefore, we only report the estimated results of the latter. The results are summarized in Tables 14 and 15 . For the manufacturing sector, we integrated 58 manufacturing industries into 38 industries in order to be consistent with keiretsu data published in Dodwell Marketing Consultants (1995) . For the service sector, among our 50 industries, we were unable to obtain data for nine industries, namely other insurance services, postal services, education, research institutes for natural sciences, research institutes for social sciences and humanities, health and hygiene, private non-profit organizations' services, social insurance and welfare, and unclassified services.
Therefore, the maximum sample size is 41.
INSERT TABLE 14 AND TABLE 15 The determinants of Japan's inward FDI penetration are very different for the manufacturing sector and the service sector. In the manufacturing sector, we found advantages in managerial resources and factor intensity to be significant, while policy variables were significant in the service sector.
The results we obtained for the manufacturing sector are as follows: The estimated coefficients of RDINT (R&D intensity), UNIV (skilled-labor intensity) and CLRATIO (capital-labor ratio) are significantly positive and robust. Consistent with the standard theory of FDI, Japan's inward FDI penetration is relatively high in industries that have a higher R&D intensity, a higher skilled-labor intensity, and a higher capital-labor ratio. The coefficient of ADINT (advertisement intensity), however, is not significant. The estimated coefficient on LAND (land intensity) was negative as we expected but insignificant in most cases. In the case of the market structure variables, the estimated coefficient on HERF (Herfindahl index) is insignificant. Contrary to our expectations, the coefficient on JOBSEP (job separation rate) is negative but insignificant. The coefficient of DPROD is positive but insignificant. In the case of policy variables, the estimated coefficients on REGCUR (a dummy for currently regulated industries) and REGPAST (a dummy for industries regulated in the past) are not significant. The estimated coefficients on PUBEMP (the share of workers employed by local or central government) is negative and significant as we expected. The estimated coefficients on the two keiretsu variables, HORIZ (the share of workers employed by horizontal keiretsu firms) and VERT (the share of workers employed by vertical keiretsu firms) are not significant.
In the service sector, the estimated coefficients of RINVJAUS (Japan's FDI restrictiveness minus U.S.
FDI restrictiveness) and PUBEMP (the share of workers employed by local or central government) are negative and significant. These results are consistent with the results obtained by Fukao and Ito (2001) , and imply that by eliminating its restrictions on inward FDI and reducing government activities, Japan can equations without domestic demand growth.
increase inward FDI in the service sector. In the case of locational advantage variables for the service sector, as we expected, the estimated coefficient of LAND (land intensity) is negative while the coefficient of UNIV (skilled-labor intensity) is positive in many cases. However, they are not significant. Contrary to our expectations, the coefficient of JOBSEP (job separation rate) is negative but insignificant. In the case of the variables that stand for the importance of intangible assets, the estimated coefficient of RDINT (R&D intensity) is negative and the coefficient of ADINT (advertisement intensity) is positive. But both are not significant in many cases. The coefficient of DPROD is positive but insignificant. In the service sector, the estimated coefficient on HERF (Herfindahl index) is positive and significant in most cases.
One interpretation of this result is as follows: The Herfindahl index tends to be higher when economies of scale work at the firm level; in such industries we will observe active inward and outward FDI.
In the case of the keiretsu variables, we did not get significant results in both the manufacturing and the service sectors, which is consistent with the results obtained in most of the previous studies. Again, this suggests that keiretsu do not work as an impediment to inward FDI in Japan. 
Conclusions
In this paper we compiled new statistics on the employment of Japanese affiliates of foreign firms (JAFF) in Japan at the 3-digit industry level for the year 1996, using micro data of the Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan. According to our new statistics (Tables 3 and 4) , JAFF with 33.4% or more foreign ownership in the service sector employed 308,000 workers in 1996, which is nearly five times greater than the number reported in MITI (1999). In the case of the manufacturing sector, JAFF with 33.4% or more foreign ownership employed 176,000 workers in 1996, which is 10% greater than the number reported in MITI (1999). The underestimation in MITI's survey is substantial in the case of the service sector.
Using our statistics, we compared FDI in Japan with FDI in the United States at the 3-digit industry level. We found that as of 1996, the share of employment by JAFF in the service sector reached one fifth of that of the United States. However, FDI into Japan is growing at an amazing speed. The total of FDI flows in the last three years is greater than the FDI stock at the end of the 1996 fiscal year. In the next 7 or 8 years, the share of employment by Japanese affiliates of foreign firms in the service sector may reach a level almost equal to that observed in the United States.
We also estimated an empirical model to examine the determinants of Japan's inward FDI 17 As Fukunari Kimura and Sadao Nagaoka pointed out, it is difficult to test the effect of impediments penetration using our cross-industry statistics. We found that the determinants of Japan's inward FDI penetration are very different for the manufacturing sector and the service sector. In the manufacturing sector, we found advantages in managerial resources and factor intensity to be significant. In the service sector, policy variables were significant. This result implies that by eliminating restrictions on inward FDI and reducing government activities, Japan can increase inward FDI in service sector. In the case of the keiretsu variables, we did not obtain significant results in both the manufacturing and the service sectors.
This suggests that keiretsu does not work as an impediment to inward FDI in Japan.
We found that compared with FDI in the U.S., FDI in Japan's service sector is more concentrated in a limited number of industries. Four industries, wholesale trade, eating and drinking places, retail trade, and computer programming and software account for 77% of all the workers employed by JAFF. In Japan, there are what may be labeled "sanctuary" sectors, such as medical services, utilities, postal services, and education. If international competition in these sectors were introduced through the participation of foreign capital, this would undoubtedly contribute to Japan's structural reform process. In order to remove government impediments to direct investment by foreign companies, not only should the principle of equal treatment irrespective of nationality be applied, but restrictions on market access should be eased. In the "sacred" sectors, restrictions on market access, which take precedence over equal treatment, impede direct investment by foreign companies. In fact, even Japanese corporations are sometimes prohibited from participating in those markets because of legal restrictions. The very existence of public entities also impedes participation by private companies. In order to encourage market participation by foreign companies in areas in which governmental involvement is high, there is a need to solve difficult issues such as how to introduce competitive principles without violating the public interest.
which cover all industries (such as Japan's inferior accounting standards) by our cross-industry regression. Investment Council (various years), and the Japanese Government (various years).
Notes to Table 7
Imports, Exports, and Domestic Output:
Our data on Japan's imports, exports, and total domestic output are taken from the 1995 Japan Input-Output Tables (Japanese Government 1998).
In the context of our analysis, cross-border service trade statistics in Japan's I-O tables have the following shortcomings:
(i) Imports and exports in I-O tables do not include payments and receipts for construction services which, if provided by non-residents, should be considered as service imports.
(ii) As merchandise imports are on a CIF basis, I-O output tables omit those services -transportation and insurance -that are associated with the import of goods and already included in the value of goods imports.
(iii) The value of overseas whole-sellers' activities is included in the value of goods imports either on FOB basis or on CIF basis, while the value of domestic whole-sellers' activities for exported goods is properly summed up in the output of wholesale trade sector.
In order to solve these problems, we used Bank of Japan (various issues) data on trade in construction and civil engineering, water transportation, and air transportation services. For imports of wholesale trade services which are included in the value of goods imports, we estimated distribution margins in the following way. We calculated the ratio of distribution margins for exported goods to total exports on an FOB basis, and estimated margins on imported goods by multiplying imports on an FOB basis by the commercial margin ratio. We obtained the value of goods imports on an FOB basis from Bank of Japan (various issues).
In the case of financial intermediary services, we calculated a measure of import quantities which is comparable to our measure of activities for this sector, that is, current income. We derived this by multiplying the industry's import/output ratio of the I-O tables with the industry's total current income.
We should note that, in the case of the manufacturing sector, imports are on a CIF basis and include the value of services that are associated with the import of goods.
Our data on U.S. imports and total domestic output are taken from the 1992 U.S. Input-Output Tables   (U. S. Department of Commerce 1995c). Due to the same shortcomings as in the case of Japan's Input-Output tables, we revised the data of the I-O tables, using data on cross-border transactions of U.S.
International Services (U.S. Department of Commerce 1999) for construction and civil engineering, railway passenger and freight transportation, road passenger and freight transportation, water and air transportation, and supporting services for transport. Data on imports of financial intermediary services, telecommunications, eating and drinking places, and hotels and lodging places are also taken from U.S.
Department of Commerce (1999) . For imports of wholesale trade services, we estimated distribution margins that are included in the value of goods imports in the same way as with Japan's imports. We should note that imports data in U.S. Department of Commerce (1999) exclude imports from U.S. firms' foreign affiliates.
Number of Workers Employed by Foreign Affiliates of Japanese Firms:
Our data on the number of workers employed by foreign affiliates of Japanese firms in the manufacturing industries are compiled using the micro-data of MITI's Survey on Trends of Japan's Business Activities Abroad, 1996. In the case of the non-manufacturing sector except the primary sector,
we use the micro-data of Toyo Keizai Shinpo-sha's Directory of Japanese Subsidiaries Abroad, 1996, CD-ROM version.
Notes to Table 13
Japan's Inward FDI Penetration (FDIJA):
The share of the number of workers employed by JAFF (Japanese Affiliates of Foreign Firms) that are 10% or more foreign-owned in Japan's total number of workers in 1996. Our data are compiled using the micro-data of the 1996 Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan.
R&D Intensity (RDINT):
RDINT is defined as the ratio of R&D expenses to the gross value-added in each industry. In the case of the manufacturing sector, the data are compiled using the industry-level data provided in Shibuya (1995, 1997) . In the case of the service sector, the data are taken from the 1995 Japan I-O Tables (Japanese Government 1998). R&D expenses are defined as the amount of input from the research industry to each industry.
Advertisement Intensity (ADINT):
ADINT is defined as the advertising expenses per employee in each industry. In the case of the manufacturing sector, the industry-level data provided in Shibuya (1995, 1997) are used. In the case of the service sector, the data are taken from the 1995 Japan I-O Tables (Japanese Government: 1998). The advertising expenses are defined as the amount of input from the advertising industry to each industry.
Capital-Labor Ratio (CLRATIO):
The industry-level data provided in Shibuya (1995, 1997) are used.
Land Intensity (LAND):
Our data on LAND are taken from the Development Bank of Japan (2000) and Nikkei QUICK Information Technology (2000) . We first calculated the ratio of the book value (unit: billions of yen) of owned land to the number of employees for each firm. LAND is a weighted average of the land/employee ratio in each industry. We used the number of employees of each firm as a weight. For water supply and sewerage systems industries, we calculated the land/employee ratio using MOF (Japan Ministry of Finance) (1996) . We first regressed the ratio calculated using the Development Bank of Japan's data on the ratio calculated using MOF's data for the industries that have the ratios calculated by both data. We then took the adjusted ratios for water supply and sewerage systems industries by using the estimated regression equation.
Skilled Labor Intensity (UNIV):
UNIV is defined as the ratio of the number of university graduate employees to the total number of employees in that particular industry. The data are taken from the Statistics Bureau, Japan Prime Minister's Office (1995) and Policy Planning and Research Department, Minister's Secretariat, Japan Ministry of Labor (1996) .
Herfindahl Index (HERF):
HERF is calculated from the each firm's share of the number of employees in the total number of employees in each industry. The data are complied using the micro-data of the 1996 Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan.
Top 4-Firm Concentration Ratio (CR4):
CR4 is calculated from each firm's share of the number of employees in the total number of employees in each industry. The data are complied using the micro-data of the 1996 Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan.
U.S. Inward FDI Penetration (FDIUS):
The share of the number of workers employed by foreign firms' U.S. affiliates in the total number of workers in the U.S. in 1992. The data are taken from the U.S. Department of Commerce (1995a).
Currently Regulated Industries (REGCUR):
REGCUR is a dummy variable which takes one for currently regulated industries, otherwise zero.
According to the information in the OECD's Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements (various years), the currently regulated industries are the petroleum and the leather and leather products industries.
Industries Regulated in the Past (REGPAST):
REGPAST is a dummy variable which takes one for industries regulated in the past, otherwise zero.
According to the information in the OECD's Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements (various years), the industries regulated in the past are food and related products, textile products and apparel, pharmaceuticals, miscellaneous chemicals, stone, clay, and glass products, special industry machinery, electric equipment and computers, and electronic parts and devices industries.
Differences between Japan's and U.S. FDI Restrictiveness (RINVJAUS):
RINVJAUS is defined as the difference between the FDI restrictiveness of Japan and the United
States. For details of FDI restrictiveness, see the above description on FDI restrictiveness index.
Share of Public Services (PUBEMP):
PUBEMP is defined as the ratio of the number of workers employed by establishments owned by the central or local governments to the total number of employees in that particular industry in Japan. The data are taken from the Statistics Bureau, Japan Management and Coordination Agency (1998).
Productivity (DPROD):
DPROD is defined as the productivity of a particular industry in Japan relative to that in the U.S.
The data are based on Kawai (1996) . For this data, also see Kawai and Urata (1997) .
Job Separation Rate (JOBSEP):
The data on JOBSEP are taken from the Policy Planning and Research Department, Minister's Secretariat, Japan Ministry of Labor (1995).
Vertical Keiretsu (VERT):
VERT is defined as the share of workers employed by vertical keiretsu firms in the total work force.
In the case of the manufacturing sector, the industry-level data provided in Shibuya (1995, 1997) are used. In the case of the service sector, the data on keiretsu were taken from Toyo Keizai Shinpo-sha (1992 Shinpo-sha ( , 2000 . We treated all the firms that belong to forty-three independent corporate groups (Toyota, Nissan, Hitachi, Toshiba, Matsushita, Taisei, etc.) and all the subsidiaries of such firms as vertical keiretsu firms.
Horizontal Keiretsu (HORIZ):
HORIZ is defined as the share of workers employed by horizontal keiretsu firms in the total work force. In the case of manufacturing sector, the industry-level data provided in Shibuya (1995, 1997) are used. In the case of service sector, the data on keiretsu were taken from Toyo
Keizai Shinpo-sha (1992 Shinpo-sha ( , 2000 . We treated all the firms that belong to the Shacho-kai (President Clubs) of seven corporate groups (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyou, Sanwa, Ichikan, and Tokai) and all the subsidiaries of such firms as horizontal keiretsu firms. 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 Fruit juice, Sensitive materials for photography (*7) The specified 11 companies, such as Hitachi and Arabian Oil. Sources: Nakamura, Fukao, and Shibuya (1997) Inward FDI is not subject to prior permission, but in general, to prior notification to the Minister of Finance and the related Ministers in order to determine if an inquiry is necessary.
Pharmaceuticals
The amendments abolished the condition that takeovers by foreigners require the agreement with the owners of acquired firms. Nakamura, Fukao, and Shibuya (1997) Apart from the regulations written in the Foreign Exchange Law, certain other laws, such as the following, restrict FDI in Japan:
a juridical person or association with less than a third of voting rights controlled by foreigners.
Transport of goods and passengers between Japanese ports is reserved to Japanese ships. Foreign ownership of Japanese ships can only occur through an enterprise incorporated in Japan in accordance with the Ship Law.
Foreign participation in the share capital of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone corporation (NTT) is restricted to less than one-fifth.
The limitations on foreign capital paticipation (formerly limited to less than a third) in all Type I telecommunications carriers (except for NTT and KDD) were abolished in February 1998.
The limitation on foreign capital participation in KDD was eliminated in July 1998.
Foreigners or foreign-controlled enterprises (where any of the officers executing the business is a foreigner, or 20% or more of whose voting rights in aggregate are owned by foreigners) are not granted: 1) licenses for broadcasting stations including AM, FM or television broadcasting stations; and (The bills which prohibited the granting of permissions to foreigners for the installation of cable television facilities were removed in June, 1999.) No one other than Japanese citizens or a Japanese juridical person shall become a mining right owner. Japan has no performance requirement or regulation tied in any way to the export orientation of an investment proposal under the Foreign Exchange Law.
Foreign insurers are required in all cases to lodge an initial deposit for the establishment of branches which is essentially equivalent to the share capital required of domestic companies. Initial deposits may be required of national insurers in some cases. Sectors related to national security or public health* Sectors related to national security or public health* Sectors related to national security or public health* Sectors related to national security or public health* * Under the OECD Code, members are not prevented from taking action in certain sectors, for reasons such as the protection of their essential security interests. That is, a reservation to the Code is not necessary for those sectors. In accordance with the April 1984 decision, however, such measures as controls imposed for reasons of national security or public health are now examined by the Committee. As a result, some items of reservations related to those reasons are added to the Code in 1990s.
Sectors related to national security or public health* Sectors related to national security or public health* Sectors related to national security or public health* Sectors related to national security or public health* 
